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Abstract. The article poses a kind of metaethical proposal; it suggests a certain way 
of dealing with moral issues and applying academic ethics to practice. The three relatively 
simple rules of moral behaviour, namely: Notice others around you! Be open to criticism! Act 
in a communicative way! have been discussed in relation to situations typical for academic 
environment. The author presents the problem in the form of an analytic model defined by 
him as an operational system of ethics. It enables, among other things, to expose the moral 
importance of the microscale of social experience, which is significant for the functioning of 
complex organisations such as modern universities. In the author’s view, the complexity of 
social life in today’s world should be accompanied by a relatively simple and practically useful 
ethical thought, which could be helpful in everyday activities of a particular individual.
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Introduction
Normative ethics should be simple, useful, close to the acting individual and, 
therefore, sapiential. The same should apply to academic ethics. Treating it as a highly 
specialized knowledge may be scientifically effective and attractive, but it still remains 
philosophically empty. I will try to dwell on this point in subsequent paragraphs.
„A simply-built organism cannot be large” – this heard somewhere statement, 
referring to biology, might be applied to metaethics. Is simplicity a hallmark of modern 
ethics? Is it a desirable goal of ethics? From the sociological point of view, no! There 
is a constant need for detailed ethical answers to issues arising in particular sciences 
dealing with various aspects of life (not only human) in contemporary world. Therefore, 
today’s world requires a larger-scale, more comprehensive and detailed ethics, which 
would be precise in its statements. The question is, does a modern individual also needs 
such ethics?
This question only seems to be a paradox. If we view a contemporary individual in 
microsocial terms, in other words, if we perceive him as a kind of abstract moral subject 
trying to gain an insight into cultural and civilisational intricacies of the 20th century, then 
we are doomed to repeat the above mentioned expectations: more! more detailed! more 
and more precisely! While this abstract individual is only a formal subject, philosophers’ 
impractical invention, the subject of their own imagination and a guarantor legitimizing 
philosophical speculations, it is always a concrete, acting individual, who is the real 
subject, experiencing moral dilemmas in his particular place and time. Such a real 
individual need not, or even cannot know everything about the surrounding world; yet 
he probably can and wants to know how to live in this world, so that his life is morally 
good. On the level of moral concrete, the desire to know more and more precisely, 
gives in to a permanent need to get a simple, yet not easy, answer to the question: how 
should one live?! This question, repeatedly asked in everyday life, may act as a ‘pang 
of conscience’ for ethics, which, fed up with the banality of everyday life, recurrence 
of moral problems and its own permanent inefficiency, chooses to deal with itself, its 
own analytical constructions and its own scientific environment, which, in contrast to 
laymen, is able to appreciate the importance of its highly specialized problems.
The conviction that the world may be morally cured and ordered, on the condition 
that we apply normative systems to it, systems, which are adequate to the complexity of 
the subject in question, seems to be naïve1. “Ethics starts with me!” that is a statement 
from an individual moral subject and, probably, does not go far beyond this. Ethical 
resources, both included in literature on the subject and accumulated in the experience 
of subsequent generations, form material which is morally inactive; that is, as long as 
an active acting individual will not call it to life. If, however, it is called to life, then 
its importance is measured not so much by the objective significance of the issues in 
1 The quantity and the quality are not the same, also in this respect. Hałas, E. Wychowanie do demokra-
cji w ujęciu Floriana Znanieckiego. Socjologia polityczna Floriana Znanieckiego a współczesna polityka. 
Gdańsk: Gdańskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1996, p. 153.
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question, as by its correlation to the operational situation of the moral subject. Therefore, 
adequacy, pertinence and usefulness of the moral indication mean more than the potential 
of the system it originates from2.
Ethics is a practical science and so it must undertake the risk to base on sapiential 
thought, and thus to expose itself to an objection that it formulates banal truths or 
repeats ancient philosophers’ suggestions; that it does not follow new developments and 
does not even try to create appropriate novelties. Ethics, which wants to be practical, 
must accompany an individual in his cognitive efforts and be interested in his moral 
experience. It must accompany him both in his intellectual competence and moral order, 
as well as in his naivety and moral meanness. If it does not do so, it remains one of 
numerous disciplines, cultivated somewhere and for some undefined reason.
An acting individual, a particular moral subject, requires simple ethics, which 
would be universal. Academic environment also needs such ethics. The university is 
only a specific form of organized social space; on the basic level its moral tissue does 
not differ from that of other places in our social life. Both at university as well as outside 
it, people who meet are from different walks of life; they vary in age, life experience, 
intellectual and material resources, position in the society. They also differ in their 
morality; their intentions, goals and means vary. Ethics is of fundamental character, 
as long as it recognizes and organizes basic elements of social life in a normative way. 
Appropriate fundamental norms may be applied on the level of general ethics as well as 
in its specified branches.
The following paragraphs of this article comprise a suggestion how to connect three 
indicators of moral acting. The proposed combination may serve as a systemic ethical 
tool, applicable in describing, analyzing or finding normative solutions to problematic 
situations that can be found, among others, in academic environment. In fact, they already 
play such a role, bringing positive effects in suitable situations. The remarks below are 
based on the author’s own experience of scientific, educational and organisational work 
and form a part of his own proposal for an operational system of ethics, included in his 
forthcoming habilitation paper, inspired by Florian Znaniecki’s (1882-1958) and other 
authors’ works.
1. Notice others around you!
A successful completion of this postulate is feasible on the condition that we limit 
our action and thought to the level of microscale of social experience. It seems only 
logical, that it is the level of basic social interactions, a place where acting people really 
meet; a Socratic sphere of moral relations. The use of microscale of social experience 
in the ethical operational system enables us to notice the perspective of a particular 
2 Florian Znaniecki underlined that social microstructures play a more important role in forming new 
personalities than any macroscale structures. Kurczewska, J. Florian Znaniecki i jego lekcje dla Europy 
Środkowej i Wschodniej. Teoria socjologiczna Floriana Znanieckiego a wyzwania XXI wieku. Lublin: 
Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1999, p. 300.
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experience of an acting individual3; the experience that takes place and is gained from a 
close plane of moral relations.
Modern university (and I am writing about something which comes from my 
own direct or indirect experience) is, among other things, a scene of various battles. 
Inefficiently controlled bureaucracy is spreading; the demand for reporting on scientific, 
educational and organisational activity is reaching a level of absurdity. And all this in 
the name of raising the level of efficiency, higher quality of educational offer and the 
public image. Within the academic environment, marked with internal discord, there 
is a lot of competition pertaining to power, political representation and philosophical 
outlook, scientific grants and monthly pay, surviving at the time of economic crisis and 
decrease in the birth rate. The university opens its doors widely to future students and 
equally freely lets graduates out. Its social space is becoming more and more superficial 
and formalized; the focus on rigorous procedures encourages claims and complaints. 
It follows that the least attention is put to moral quality of everyday life. Everybody 
seems to mean well, but because they give in to the above mentioned influences, they 
live and work in increasing haste and mutual dislike, stress, frustration and a sense of 
pointlessness as far as their activities are concerned.
The above mentioned phenomena, if they live not only in my imagination, will 
not be easy to eliminate and probably will not be reduced in the near future. We may 
try to include them in a macroscale ethical thought, but this will only be useful for 
research purposes. Neither collective nor institutional subjects, neither human features 
nor social phenomena may be forced to alter their system of values; it is only self-
conscious beings, i.e. concrete acting humans, individual moral subjects that can do 
that. Yet there are great discrepancies among them; they also vary in their axiological 
systems. They treat their freedom of thought as an asset and, therefore, cannot undergo 
a process of externally controlled moral pressure; the same rule applies to academic 
environment. Fortunately, their resources and functioning may be humanized! What is 
needed is moral activity of creative individuals in a social space, both in a general sense 
and also limited to the academic surrounding4. If we apply the level of microscale of 
social experience to ethics, we reveal the influences that creative individuals exert on 
moral practice. On this level ideals of an individual trigger the process of transformation 
of social norms5.
The question arises: what or who is the object or subject making me act in a 
way defined in terms of quality? Legal regulations? The statute of the university? Its 
tradition? Various interest groups that I meet in my professional life? My own wallet 
and my feeling of well–being? Or something else? All these factors are probably 
somehow relevant and the preferences revealed by attitudes of some representatives 
of the academic environment vary; yet from the moral point of view it is all of minor 
3 Znaniecki, F. Rzeczywistość kulturowa. „Humanizm i poznanie” i inne pisma filozoficzne. Warszawa: PWN, 
1991, p. 697.
4 Znaniecki, F. Wstęp do socjologii. Warszawa: PWN, 1988, p. 285−286.
5 Znaniecki, F. Elementy rzeczywistości praktycznej. „Myśl i rzeczywistość” i inne pisma filozoficzne. War-
szawa: PWN, 1987, p. 108−112.
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importance. It is a concrete individual that I meet on my way in a specific situation that 
is, or should be, of key importance. And all this regardless of his social status and his 
position in the academic hierarchy, regardless of the fact whether he is the rector, the 
lowest grade student or the receptionist having keys to classrooms at his disposal
Yes, this postulate seems banal and bombastic. But, is suggesting the application of 
a microscale perspective of thought to the normative academic ethics equally banal and 
bombastic? The above mentioned factors of frustration, namely academic bureaucracy, 
lack of funds, formality and mass education, as well as some others, lose their importance 
in view of straightforward moral relations. A concrete individual I see around me is not 
only a part of the educated ‘mass’; he is not only a formal object. Even if he plays a 
certain role in magnifying the amount of bureaucracy and, therefore, makes my work 
harder, he is probably not entirely responsible for my increased efforts. I cannot be 
absolutely sure about that, but there are some grounds to think in this way as I realize 
that in a totally opposite situation, i.e. when I am suspected of lack of goodwill, accused 
of being a formalist, informed about the inconvenience others have suffered on my 
account, I feel I must and I want to justify my actions and explain their reasons; I must 
and want to show what my responsibilities are and my share in the organisation’s aims. 
We are all – both me and my enemy in a situation of conflict – forced to act within an 
institutionalised system of values, which is not entirely our own doing6. The perspective 
of a microscale of social experience helps to notice a particular individual, who acts in a 
specific situation within a system. And, what is more important, it enables to restore the 
culture-forming quality to ethics, both on a general scale as well as in a more specific, 
for example, academic environment: If you want to increase moral value of systemic 
conditions of human activities, recognize these conditions on a microscale social level 
and then allow and help those you meet to eliminate the evil they suffer from! Although 
the results will not be global or immediate, they will surely turn out to be significant in 
due course. They will also become permanent as they will be appreciated and aimed at 
by partial, but factual authors of the change. I am basing my conviction on the fact that 
(a) an acting individual, even if wise and good to a limited extent, and even if he does 
not belong to the social elite7 (whatever that means today), is able to change things for 
the better in his surrounding8, and (b) it is vital that the knowledge about it does not 
escape practical ethics.
2. Be open to criticism!
Karl Raimund Popper (1902-1994) created a simple rule of behaviour, which he 
called a moral creed: I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, together we 
6 Hayek, F.A. Konstytucja wolności. Warszawa: PWN, 2006, p. 73−74.
7 Szacki, J. Znaniecki. Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1986, p. 177.
8 Wocial, J. Wstęp: Znanieckiego filozofia wartości. „Myśl i rzeczywistość” i inne pisma filozoficzne. Warsza-
wa: PWN, 1987, p. LV.
Wojciech Zieliński. Remarks on an Operational System of Ethics Academic Applications80
may get nearer to the truth9. It is a tribute paid to (a) regulating role of the idea of the truth 
in human actions (b) the rule of approaching the truth through communication. Within 
contemporary social sciences a great importance is paid to communicative aspects 
of social life, to the ethics of discussion etc. What causes problems is understanding, 
acknowledging and acceptance of the discovered truth. It may be that the greatest 
difficulties lie in something which is apparently theoretically simplest, namely in what 
has already been mentioned, i.e. in the intellectual modesty and the readiness to admit 
the errors of our own ways, our incompetence and the lack of certainty.
The postulate of being open to criticism, which is vital for the ethics of critical 
rationalism, seems to be extremely difficult for application in academic environment. 
This difficulty lies not so much in specified fields of scientific cognition (although 
even here we can encounter difficulties) as in moral mundaneness of social relations 
among people working in an academic environment. The people there occupy different 
positions in the hierarchy. A postulate of openness to criticism, when applied to a 
freshman seems to be quite obvious but when it refers to an academic authority or ‘guru’, 
or an otherwise important person, may turn out to be quite inappropriate. Numerous 
scientific conferences and the typical order in which speakers take the floor may serve 
as a source of interesting sociological observations and ethical reflection on the subject; 
while the important and well-known people speak first, the beginners are the last to take 
part. I myself have been fortunate enough to listen through all the speeches at several 
conferences, thanks to which I have been a witness of many interesting, well prepared 
and well presented speeches. Sometimes those last ones were made in the presence of a 
handful of people.
I mention it in order to underline the nature of obligation. The postulate to be open 
to criticism is ethical as long as it is absolute, without consideration for the person. 
Otherwise it remains fictitious or a test paper of academic hypocrisy. Academic ethics, 
at least the one that is described in this article, demands absolute openness to criticism 
from any member of academic environment. It is almost certain that if viewed from the 
macroscale, it remains futile and hence may be treated as useless. The microscale of 
social experience seems to be only applicable perspective. On the microsocial level the 
attitude of openness or its lack are both verified in a specific situation and with concrete 
people participating in action. Although each of them belongs to structures external 
to the given operational situation and occupies a specific position in the hierarchy, his 
moral attitude refers directly to another person in a horizontal dimension of a situation.
Popper thinks that critical rationalism requires to free people from custody of a 
recognized authority constantly10; it demands permanent breaking from thoughtless habit 
of respecting people for the sake of promoting respect for the argument. And all this 
because the power of argument is of greater cognitive and moral significance than the 
social position of the arguing person11. The normative equality of arguments presented 
9 Popper, K. R. Mit schematu pojęciowego: W obronie nauki i racjonalności. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 
1997, p. 10.
10 Popper, K. R. Społeczeństwo otwarte i jego wrogowie: Urok Platona. Warszawa: PWN, 2006, p. XVIII.
11 Ibid., p. XIV.
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in a discussion, assumed by critical rationalism, allows us to reject any hierarchical 
superiority of an individual as the basis for moral privileges in an operational situation. 
Those who, in a specific situation, are in a higher position on the social ladder (even 
if this high position is their own opinion) should take the main responsibility for their 
actions12. It should be repeated that such postulates cannot be fulfilled on a macrosocial 
scale, yet when applied to the social microscale they are long-lasting. This permanence 
is typical for basic requirements of a simple normative ethics.
The above statements can be illustrated with an example taken from academic 
practice. A student questions the results of his exam, but at the same time he expresses 
some objections to the way he was treated by the academic lecturer. He feels that his 
doubts regarding his grade have been ignored. He asks the person in charge of the 
didactic processes for intervention. The following attempt at clarifying the situation is 
not successful; the examiner’s standpoint differs considerably from that of the student; 
as a result, a decision is made to solve the controversial issue during a meeting of both 
parties. However, the lecturer refuses to take part in it, regarding the very proposition as 
entirely improper and undermining his authority. The problem, initially viewed as quite 
trivial, becomes more and more complicated and a relatively satisfying solution is only 
found after a long time.
There are various possible ways of analysing the situation. From the formal and 
legal point of view, we may have doubts concerning the applied procedures. Apparently: 
(a) the requirements for the examination were not precisely defined, (b) the university 
regulations were not precise, (c) the university representatives proved incompetent 
because they were not able to solve the problem at the start. Yet rules and regulations 
are not the only relevant factor in this situation; from the ethical point of view the moral 
component is of greater importance. While initial moral doubts of the student referring 
to the lecturer’s attitude may arouse doubts concerning the clarity of his intentions – 
we cannot deny a possibility that the student tried to defend himself against the bad 
mark using vile means – at the central stage of the dispute, i.e. at the point when the 
lecturer refuses to participate in a confrontational meeting, moral doubts become clearly 
asymmetrical; the student still maintains they are the reason for his claims, the arbiter’s 
doubts have become more grounded but the examiner has denied them, demonstrating 
that his authority has been disregarded. He lacks a simple openness to criticism and 
doubts concerning the quality of his work.
Summing up, I would like to emphasize that the operational system of ethics which 
is presented in this article exposes the microscale of moral problems, which allows to 
notice concrete people in specific situations in which they are acting and enables to 
examine moral aspects of those situations while using arguments devoid of non-factual 
components of its assessment. I am fully aware how difficult to accept it is for those 
individuals and circles which are interested first of all in maintaining and proving the 
moral value of their own status quo. However, Socratic heritage is still demanding!
12 Popper, K. R., supra note 10, p. 65−66.
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3. act in a communicative Way!
Noticing an individual around you and maintaining attitude of openness to possible 
criticism enables us to shape the moral tissue of social life and introduce the desired 
symmetry into moral relations. This symmetry seems to be the structural condition of all 
the undertakings leading to upgrading moral value of collective and organized activities. 
No ethical requirements delivered to specified academic subjects such as individual 
moral subjects, social groups or institutions will be successfully fulfilled if there are 
no morally adequate actions on the part of those who introduced the requirements in 
the first place. For instance, it is quite obvious that subjects such as students preparing 
their diplomas or academic workers preparing publications for their next degree are 
required to do so in an honest and reliable way. If the thesis supervisor has no time to 
read and correct his students’ theses because he also works at another high school, then 
there is a greater risk that the job will be done in an inaccurate and unreliable way. If 
an academic employer requires his workers to proceed with their scientific degrees on 
time, perform their educational job well and be active in their organizational work but 
he does not support them in return, not to mention offering adequate pay, then there is 
a greater risk that the job will be of poor quality. The risk will increase dramatically if 
the only guarantee of employment is formally performed promotion while the way it 
was achieved and all the other responsibilities turn out to be of secondary importance. A 
feeling of moral decay overwhelming the whole academic environment is a factor that 
leads to a further crisis.
There is a possibility, however, of a certain illusion. A crisis within a certain 
environment is one thing but my share in it is not obviously the same. I may suffer 
inconveniences for the reasons beyond my power, but I do need to blame them on others. 
Only symmetry in exchange of goods is morally required. Evil, injustice, impoliteness 
and others, if they happen, should remain non-symmetrical. I realize that such remarks 
(like some of those expressed earlier) sound banal and lofty, but only if they are formed 
in general, not referring to a definite situation. They turn out to be valid when applied to 
the microscale of social experience, when they are addressed at particular people actively 
participating in a specific situation. They become organizational guidelines in addition 
to their character of being general ethical recommendations. When combining what is 
philosophically general with what is sociologically specific ethics become a practical 
science. An operational system of ethics, which enables to analytically formalize such 
links, becomes useful in metaethics.
The postulate of communicative acting, formulated within normative ethics and 
underlined in this part of the article combines philosophical and sociological perspectives. 
Let us now try to relate it to an imaginary problem situation: you act in a particular place 
at a particular time, in a defined social situation; you are facing a concrete individual, 
whose view of the situation probably differs from your evaluation of it; you represent a 
group, institution or structure and your opponent is probably a representative of some 
parallel structures; you are full of your own ideas, values and emotions and you guess 
that the person you are facing has got his parallel ideas. Therefore, regardless of what 
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rules, instructions, procedures, etiquette and good manners manuals say, be morally 
daring and, remaining ready to take responsibility for your actions, do not limit yourself 
to formal rules governing a situation. Go beyond all those standards and procedures, in 
a good way. Make your own moral standards and humanize your own actions. Do not 
wait for others to provide you with convenient moral rules of behaviour; they may never 
come on time.
This postulate is a radical one as it is based on a conviction that ethics needs specific 
radicalism. Ethics which wants to have practical consequences must free itself from 
its today’s role of being an aesthetic addition to science and from its various qualifiers 
(ethics of this or that); it must go back to the original perspective of questions and 
fundamental imperatives. To make it feasible, it must be freed from its role of an 
academic discipline which is governed by an unbearable manner of fragmenting moral 
experience and avoiding general statements. For obvious reasons, the idea of ethics 
returning to its roots and its factual chances in this respect are not contradictory.
The postulate of communicative acting or, more precisely, acting in a communicative 
way, which would be critical and open to criticism is of universal character. It may be 
applied to any given problem situation, which is registered and analysed on the level 
of microscale of social experience and the individual level of any real or potential 
participant of such a situation, both in academic surrounding and outside it. It does not 
show any consideration for the fact who the people involved are or what structures they 
represent. For example, regardless of the role played in the university structure, I may 
and should patiently explain the reasons of my behaviour, my evaluations, my doings 
to a given person, going beyond (if necessary) what is formally required and repeating 
(when necessary) even the most trivial things. Regardless of however ‘unimportant’ role 
my opponent plays, I may and should listen carefully to how the problem in discussion 
appears to him13. I may be wrong and he may be right, and, therefore, we may approach 
the truth together. No matter how problematic the question of truth in contemporary 
philosophy and science is, and regardless of the differences between contemporary 
university and the university of a few centuries or decades ago, the culture-forming 
potential of moral relations within the microscale of social experience remains the key 
factor in systemic activities, organizational work and milieu ethos. The university may 
still maintain its role of a creator and medium of high moral culture provided the members 
of the academic environment, enchanted with modern advances in communication 
technologies, will nourish their concern for moral value of direct contacts.
conclusions
One of my students wrote: „In my view, the aim of contemporary ethics is to 
caution people against defining themselves entirely through their social position. On the 
other hand, the surrounding world favours such simplified definition of man.” I share 
13 I must be able to suspend my own greatness in order to notice others’ smallness. I must be ready to admit that 
the proportion is inverse.
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the opinion about the importance of this task. In my article I have endeavoured to show 
possible ways to solve the problem. They refer to academic surrounding, whose position 
in the society is of no small importance.
If we assume that moral practice is a process or, rather, a range of various processes, 
and that creative powers of individual moral subjects14, play a major role in it, then 
it becomes only natural that the focus is on (a) exposing the microscale of social 
experience, (b) the role that concrete acting people play in it and (c) the significance 
of simple imperatives, addressed at their behaviour. Modern universities are socially 
complex structures, yet, when viewed in detail, still show the presence of some basic 
moral tissue. It is produced and reproduced during immediate interpersonal contacts, 
which bind individuals in an academic environment. This moral tissue, if it is to be used 
creatively, has to be accessed not only in an indirect, cognitive way, but also through a 
practical philosophical approach. If we want to improve moral quality of functioning or 
managing at universities, we have to use potentially simplest ethics.
An operational system of ethics suggested in this article allows to maintain relative 
simplicity of a normative proposal addressed at academic environment. The three above 
mentioned and explained rules of behaviour are not a novelty; yet placing them within 
a specific analytical system and a pattern of objective relations permits us to nurture a 
hope that this very simple ethics may be applied to the very complex and demanding 
academic environment. It is not enough to discuss academic ethics; moral issues, how to 
behave in an honest way in a given situation etc. are more important things to be argued 
about. To believe in a possibility of arguing about ethical issues without being exposed 
to the discomfort of moral evaluation would be naïve. The rule of critical communication 
activity, promoted in this article, is a principle of open morality; a principle of excluding 
any fight, moderating antagonisms, aiming at peace and compromise15. This principle 
belongs to ethical heritage; it was Socrates who called on people to respect each other; he 
also believed that others are our greatest treasure16. The rule of critical communication 
activity, if applied in an academic environment, may encourage and help respect the 
need of a moral activity of an individual functioning in his own social surrounding17; 
when placed in an operational system of ethics it helps to verify whether normative 
solutions are justified in relation to their factual relevance to the object of the planned 
action.
14 Znaniecki, F. Upadek cywilizacji zachodniej. „Humanizm i poznanie” i inne pisma filozoficzne. Warszawa: 
PWN, 1991, p. 933.
15 Znaniecki, F. Ludzie teraźniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości. Warszawa: PWN, 2001, p. 306.
16 Popper, K. R., supra note 10, p. 241 et seq.
17 Wojnar, I. Floriana Znanieckiego utopia humanistyczna. Florian Znaniecki: Myśl społeczna a wychowanie. 
Inspiracje dla współczesności. Warszawa: Żak, 2001, p. 45.
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paStaBoS apIE opERacINę EtIkoS SIStEmą:  
akadEmINIS taIkymaS
Wojciech Zieliński
Gdansko universitetas, Lenkija
Santrauka. Straipsnyje pristatomi pasirinkti operacinės etikos sistemos projekto elemen­
tai, kurie, be kita ko, gali būti pritaikyti įvairių moralinių šiuolaikinio universiteto veiklos 
ir kasdieninio gyvenimo aspektų analizei. Universitetas vis dar gali atlikti savo kaip kūrėjo 
ir aukštos moralinės kultūros skleidėjo vaidmenį, jei akademinės aplinkos atstovai, naudo­
damiesi komunikacinių technologijų privalumais, puoselės moralinę tiesioginio bendravimo 
vertę.
Wojciech Zieliński. Remarks on an Operational System of Ethics Academic Applications86
Tokios sąvokos ir raktažodžiai kaip „socialinės patirties mikroskalė“, „veikiantis žmo­
gus“, „operacinė situacija“, „moralinės dilemos situacija“, „aksiologinis sprendimas“ ir kt., 
gali funkcionuoti drauge sisteminiame moralinės patirties aprašyme metodologinio indivi­
dualizmo pagrindu. Tinkamas akademinės tikrovės aprašymas yra išeitinis praktinės etikos 
taškas, t. y. etikos, kuri gali būti priimtina ir pritaikyta akademinės aplinkos atstovų jų 
kasdieninėje veikloje.
„Etika prasideda nuo manęs…“ Tai sena moralės tiesa, tačiau šiandien mums reikalingi 
šiuolaikiniai, tačiau subtilūs instrumentai, kurie galėtų padėti tai įgyvendinti, ypač universi­
tete, kuris yra moraliniu požiūriu ypatinga vieta. Įvairių mokslinių disciplinų atstovai, kurie 
yra specialistai, vargiai priima net ir palyginti paprastą moralų patarimą. 
Straipsnio autorius siūlo tris santykinai  paprastas moralaus elgesio taisykles: „Pastebėk 
aplinkinius!“, „Būk atviras kritikai!“, „Elkis komunikabiliai!“. Šios taisyklės svarstomos įvai­
riose tipiškose akademinės aplinkos situacijose. Autorius pristato problemą analitinio modelio 
forma, jo apibrėžiama kaip „operacinė etikos sistema“. Be kita ko, tai leidžia išryškinti socia­
linės patirties mikroskalę, kuri yra svarbi tokių sudėtingų organizacijų kaip šiuolaikiniai 
universitetai funkcionavimui.
Autoriaus požiūriu, socialinio gyvenimo šiuolaikiniame pasaulyje sudėtingumas turėtų 
būti lydimas gana paprasto ir praktiškai naudingo etinio mąstymo, kuris galėtų praversti 
konkretaus žmogaus kasdieninėje veikloje. Autorius siūlo idėją, kad normatyvinė etika turė­
tų būti paprasta, naudinga, artima veikiančiam žmogui, taigi išmintinga. Tas pats turėtų 
galioti akademinei etikai. Jos vertinimas kaip itin specializuotų žinių visumos moksliniu 
požiūriu gali būti efektyvus ir patrauklus, tačiau filosofiniu požiūriu vis tiek lieka tuščias.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: humanistinis koeficientas, kritinis racionalizmas, komunikacinė 
veikla, socialinės patirties mikroskalė, veikiantis žmogus, operacinė situacija, moralinės dile­
mos situacija, aksiologinis sprendimas, kritinė komunikacinė veikla.
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